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Abstract 
A full analysis of the text of a contract, asiento, between Philip II of Spain and a Genoese 
merchant-banker details how, in this pre-modern composite state, merchant-bankers acted as 
agents of the Crown to collect many scattered sources of income and debts to the Crown, and to 
transform them into large and regular cash flows for the army. Since the availability of these 
sources was uncertain, the contract provided for considerable flexibility, particularly for the 
banker who, in return, had to report to accountants for audit and, if necessary, calculate interest 
at about one percent per month.  
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“Most states in the early modern period were composite states, including more than one 
country under the sovereignty of one ruler. These composite states or monarchies could consist 
of completely separate countries, divided by sea or by other states, such as the dominions of 
the Habsburg monarchy in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands” (Koenigsberger 1978). 3 
Composite states were the prizes in the “game of thrones” that the Habsburg so skillfully 
played (Elliott 1963). Flanders, perhaps the most prosperous region of Europe at the time, had 
welcomed the new king, Philip II, as a protector against the ambitions of the King of France. 
These territories, together with the overseas empire that was conquered in the newly 
discovered New World and the Philippines, made Spain the superpower of its time.4  
Keeping such a state together was another task when Europe was divided by the Reformation 
and military costs were multiplied by new technologies (large armies of mercenaries, guns and 
the response of the trace italienne).5 Public finance systems were no less fragmented than 
states. They were still rooted in local customs, sometimes for reasons of efficiency, and no 
central administration had been developed to collect and transfer large and small amounts of 
 
3 “This article was originally given as a talk at a one-day conference organized for the Royal 
Historical Society on 21 September 1971 by Conrad Russell on the theme of `Multiple Kingdoms 
and Monarchies’” (Elliott 1992). See also Grafe (2012, 2013, 2015). 
4 Thompson (1992, p. 10) estimates that Philip II’s annual revenue was about seven times 
higher than that of Elizabeth I in England. After 1580, Portugal and its overseas colonies 
were added to the empire. 




funds. In this context, international merchant-bankers were more indispensible to 
sovereigns than the Rothchilds and Bleichröders of the nineteenth century. 
Philip II found himself in a situation not unlike that of the Pope who received tax revenues 
from all over Western Europe. Jacob Fugger (1459-1525) had done a very good business 
selling indulgences. From a banker’s point of view, there is no difference between selling an 
office or a rent to be collected in this world or the other. Following the work of Guidi Bruscoli 
on the role of the Italian merchant-bankers as financial agents of the pope, a parallel can be 
drawn between this role and that of the Genoese merchant-bankers with Philip II. “The 
collection of the tithes [tax on ecclesiastical income] and their transfer to Rome were 
traditionally delegated to the most influential merchant-bankers, the only ones originally able 
to reach, thanks to their close-knit and well-organized networks, the most remote markets of 
Europe” (Guidi Bruscoli, 2007, p. 161).6  
Carlos V had relied mainly on the Fugger and other German bankers (Ehrenberg 1896) because 
of his activities in the Holy Roman Empire. Jacob Fugger lent him two thirds of the sum spent 
to be elected Emperor (Häberlein, 2012, p. 64). Philip II inherited the western part of his 
father’s empire, roughly Spain, the Netherlands, southern Italy and territories along the former 
Lotharingian line. The Genoese merchant-bankers7 were closer than the Fugger to the center of 
gravity of trade and finance between these territories. Building on their long practice of public 
finance management in the Republic of Genoa and its Mediterranean colonies (Felloni, 1971, 
2010), they took a leading position in the private management of the public finances of Philip 
II. 
 
6 Also, on page 110, “Papal bankers acted as intermediaries and placed the bonds of the 
public debt with a large number of small investors.” 
7 Like other authors, we should use the expression “merchant-bankers” because operations of 
credit and trade were tied together, especially through trade fairs. However, to simplify we 




The services of the Genoese bankers to Philip II were formalized in contracts, the 
famous asientos, which covered a period of about two to thee years.8  These contracts provided 
the king with credit, cash transfers and many other financial services. They did not have a 
standard or identical formula in order to adapt to diverse bankers and to the changing demands 
of the king. However, they share many similar charateristics: currency exchange, money 
transfers, cash transport, credit component, options to the banker to refinance debts into long-
term annuities and various other financial services. Large contracts feature all of them. 
Given the needs of the state, these were much more than loans, as previous authors have 
pointed out. However, the main focus in published studies, sometimes the only one, has been 
on the loans that were referred to as “sovereign loans”, a misleading term in this case. The 
stock of these loans never exceeded 10 percent of the total public debt of the Spanish 
monarchy, and it was sometimes much lower than that. In the last decade of Philip II’s reign, 
when the revenues and the military expenditures were at their highest, the loan component of 
asientos should be considered as cash advances in the process of collecting funds from 
disparate and uncertain sources to make large deliveries to the military.  
Although many studies on asientos have been published,9 mainly because Philip II facilitated 
access to them in the archives he set up in the castle of Simancas, they produce only overall 
tables, sometimes with specific details, and focus on the debt aspect. The analysis of these 
services through the in-depth study of the text of an asiento signed in Madrid has never been 
made.10 This article will show that reporting numbers with the amounts and the timings of the 
 
8 When the Crown needed to make an urgent transfer with a short-term loan, it used a letter 
of credit. Many of them are preserved in the General Archives of Simancas. 
9 See Lonchay 1907; Carande 1943 (for the first half of the 16th century); Castillo Pintado 1963; 
Ruiz Martín 1965; Ruiz Martín 1968; Ulloa 1977; Neri 1989, pp. 61-64; Canosa 1998; Carlos 
Morales 2008, p. 30; Drelichman and Voth 2015. Some of them provided important general tables 
in addition to specific details. Most of them focused on the short and medium-term loans to the 
Crown, and, with the exception of Lonchay who worked on the contracts that were signed in 
Brussels, none of these authors have provided a complete analysis of the text of a contract.  
10 Lapeyre (1953) studied in depth the asientos of Simon Ruiz in his archives. Simon Ruiz was a 




payments, as others have done, is not sufficient to highlight the pivotal role of the 
Genoese in the public finances of the super-power in the pre-modern age. The text of this 
contract demonstrates that merchant-bankers were much more than bankers. They were fiscal 
agents of the Crown in the following sense. They collected money by borrowing from various 
sources, in particular at the Besançon fairs and disbursed a steady flow of funds to paymasters 
of the army. For reimbursements, they received orders of repayments, “consignaciones”, on 
numerous sources of royal revenue, some of them very small. They were not tax collectors but 
in the absence of an administration for the centralization of revenues and payments, they, or 
their agents, had to go to the local sources that were dispersed throughout the realm. 
The aim of this article is to contribute to a change in the asientos’ point of view: these contracts 
formalized the function of the merchant-bankers as Philip II’s financial and fiscal agents. To do 
this, instead of aggregating a large number of contracts through the filter of a “code” that could 
be biased by prejudices, we carefully read a contract signed with Tómas Fiesco (TF)11 on April 
3, 1591, for 340,000 ducats and let the text speak for itself. This contract is representative of 
other contracts of the same size or larger at about the same time,12 and we draw a parallel with 
the texts of three of them.  
The contract was intended to meet an essential need of the army of Flanders, namely regular 
income. Fiesco undertook to deliver mesadas, equal monthly disbursements, for about a year.13 
 
11 Tomás Fiesco was a merchant-banker with long experience. At the end of his life, he was 
appointed by Philip II as “Factor General” of the Crown. This office had been created in 1556 by 
Philip II (Ulloa 1977, p. 137; Hernández Esteve 2010, p. 87) when he appointed Fernán López del 
Campo to centralize all negotiations with the bankers and to obtain better conditions (Hernández 
Esteve 1984). The project failed, but was renewed on February 26, 1592 with the appointment of 
the Genoese Tomás Fiesco (Lapeyre 1953, p. 77; Doria 1978; Dubet 1998; Carlos Morales 2008, p. 
258) who proposed to take care of all the Crown’s needs for a year and thus bypass new asientos 
(Dubet 2000, p. 124). The project failed again. 
12 In the same year, 25 asientos were signed in Madrid, for a total of about 5.7 million ducats, 
and only three asientos were written for more money than the Fiesco contract (Appendix C).  
13 According to Lapeyre (Lapeyre, 1953, footnote 32), the system of mesadas started in 1589 




In the contract, the details about these deliveries are dispatched in less than two pages. 
Most of the 24 pages contract deals with the means of repayment and the imperfect information 
about them. The text of the contract casts a net over the many sources of revenue, ordinary 
taxes and extraordinary incomes (alcabalas and millones were the most important of them), 
contributions to the crusade, sales of offices and lands, silver from the Americas. These 
contributions are scattered through the realm, especially the small ones, which can be as low as 
50 ducats, 1/6000 of the contract.14 They are collected in a decentralized system.15 There is no 
flow of revenues from the periphery to the center that would pay the banker. The banker has to 
go himself, or his agents, to the periphery to collect the Crown’s debts. As Guidi Bruscoli 
pointed out, he is the market expert. He knows where certain alcabalas are not yet mortgaged 
on other debts and where he can sell juros (long-term annuities). He has the network and 
expertise to sell these juros when the contract allows it. The tasks of obtaining information for 
repayments, and their collection, are therefore left to the banker. The contract recognizes the 
kind of “shell game” that the banker will engage in: if one source of revenues described in the 
contract proves to be unavailable or uncertain, the banker may seek another. In doing so he 
may be assisted by lawyers or other officials. A great deal of attention is paid to the banker’s 
legal guarantees. The expression “of his own choice” for the source of revenue is used several 
times. 
The contract is implementable because all the banker’s transactions must be reported to the 
accountants of the Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas. Many of these accountants’ verifications 
have been archived and attached to the asientos. Surprisingly, these important documents have 
 
(Table 2 and Section 5). However, mesadas are already found in the asientos that guaranteed 
financial stability for the construction of the Escorial, signed with Lorenzo Spinola in 1572 
and 1574. 
14 At the time, the weekly income of an unskilled worker was a little more than one ducat. A soldier 
of the Great Armada received 4 ducats per month and a sailor, 3 ducats. The Fiesco contract refers 
to a daily wage of 1.25 ducats when legal help is required. 
15  Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley (2014) analyse the revenue structure and show how the 
decentralization of domestic revenues brought financial benefits to the Crown as it increased 




been neglected in previous studies, an omission that may have led to serious errors in 
the interpretation of asientos. The reports were also essential for the calculation of the interest. 
In the context of ex ante uncertainty about the date of payment, an ex post account often 
tracked the credit balance on which the interest rate was paid, in most cases one percent per 
month, often prorated to the exact day of payment, as we verified in our previous study on the 
Maluenda asiento (Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley 2018). The quantity of these documents varies 
from contract to contract. For the Fiesco contract, the attachments only contain information on 
the office sales (see below), but the accuracy of the report matches that of the Maluenda 
contract. It can be assumed that the other reports that did not reach the archives showed the 
same professional care. 
In this article, we first present, in section 1, a synthetic picture of the Fiesco contract. Payments 
by the bankers were made in escudos for the army of Flanders and the Crown repaid in the 
currency of Castile, the ducat. For the sake of clarity and to meet accounting requirements, the 
contract converts immediately all payments by the banker into the currency of Castile, at an 
exchange rate that is analyzed later, in section 4. After this conversion, the contract is written 
so clearly that by simply following the text, we can analyze the services provided by the 
banker, one by one. Section 2 is devoted to the first tranche of repayments from many scattered 
sources. It is based on the attachments to the contracts that document the implementation of 
these repayments in minute details. In Section 3, the interest rate on the credit part of the 
contract (about 70 percent of the total amount) is computed in the currency of the contract, the 
ducat. This computation is facilitated by the form of the contract where all payments made by 
the banker and the Crown are expressed in the same currency. We find a value of about one 
percent per month, which is in line with other contrats at the time. Section 4 is devoted to other 
issues, first, an option that is contingent on the arrival of silver from the Americas to reduce the 
size of the contract, second, the exchange rate, third, an option for the banker to be reimbursed 
by the sales of juros. That option fits with the banker’s function of merging disparate revenues, 
but we have already devoted an article to this subject (Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley 2018). In 
the concluding section, we draw some consequences for the study and the interpretation of 






2. The overall structure of the contract 
The cash disbursements by the banker amounted to 300,000 Italian escudos, 200,000 to be 
disbursed in Flanders (Antwerp, Dunkirk, Lille or Namur), and 100,000 ducats either in the 
same cities of Flanders or in Burgundy (Besançon, Gray), or Savoy (Chambery, Montluel). All 
these places were on or near the “Spanish road” that was taken by the troops from Italy to 
Flanders.16 The gold Italian escudo was the standard currency for professional soldiers. The 
places of the disbursements were left to the discretion of the banker but their schedule was 
strict: nine mesadas, of about 30,000 ducats each, from May 91 to January 92, followed an 
initial transfer of about 70,000 ducats in April. The contract states in the first page: “Tomás 
Fiesco should give as soon as possible his letters of credit for the payment to whom I will 
command”.17 
 
16 The “Spanish road” ran from Milan to Flanders—the crossing of the Alps changed over time-- 
through territories that either belonged to the empire of Philip II (Milan, part of Burgundy inherited 
from Carlos V) or to allies (Savoy). Antwerp, Dunkirk, Lille or Namur were in Flanders, while 
Besançon and Gray in Burgundy were important trading centers. Chambery and Montluel belonged 
to the duchy of Savoy. Montluel was not directly on the Spanish road but it provided a convenient 
location on the border of Savoy, 12 miles from Lyon and its important fairs (Parker 1972). 
17 The king order to Fiesco to pay to Ambrosio Spínola. He had to make the payments to Gabriel de 
Santiesteban, paymaster of the army in Flanders, or to his agent. From other asientos, we know that 
the bankers paid the mesadas usually to the “pagador del ejército de Flandes”. We do not know 
why in this asiento the king preferred to use an intermediary. The attachments of the contract 
confirm that TF made the disbursements to Ambrosio as part of a large asiento signed on May 12, 
1591 for a total amount of 600,000 ducats. That asiento appears in Appendix A. Unfortunately, all 
the records of the Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas for this asiento were not preserved in the archives. 
So, we do not have the details provided by the banker as we have for other asientos. However, we 
have some confirmation of the payments because the attachments of the asiento include notes that 
were written by the royal accountants when the heirs of Tomás Fiesco presented their documents to 
close his asientos’ accounts. The notes state that Fiesco issued and gave to the royal officials 10 
bills of exchange ordering their agents in Antwerp to pay the amounts in the dates specified in the 
contract. The king signed a cédula on May 12 (and the accountants made five copies to inform all 




The banker was to be repaid in the currency that circulated in Castile, the real. Each 
real was the equivalent of 34 maravedis (mrs), the unit that was used for the Castilian currency 
in the contracts. Another unit of account was the ducat at 375 maravedis. To simplify, we will 
use the ducat, which has a slightly lower value than the escudo. The system of asientos was 
anchored on the ex post verifications by royal accountants. Dealing with exchange rates at 
different dates and places is just not the job of an accountant. He has to check whether each 
Crown debt has been paid, using his unit of account. Since the banker received a large number 
of small payments in ducats, and the exchange markets were fragmented, it would have been 
impossible to write a monitorable contract contingent on an exchange rate. Therefore, the 
disbursements in escudos are converted at the beginning of the contract into ducats at a fixed 
rate, 300,000 escudos into 340,000 ducats. The procedure will be explained in Section 4.2. The 
banker had to assume the exchange risk. Compared to the market rate, the contract’s rate 
overvalued the escudo, and therefore the Crown’s debt, by a margin that fluctuated between 4 
and 9 percent.  
The contract summary in Table 1 provides a map for the rest of the article. It should be noted 
that all the numbers in the table are exactly the same as those in the contract.  These are the 
numbers that were used by the royal accountants in charge of monitoring the contract and, 
using an anachronism, we could take this table as a “spreadsheet” for the Contaduría Mayor de 
Cuentas. 
There are two main parts. The first two lines (in light grey) establish a cash transfer with no 
credit and no interest, in two installments. That initial transfer, about 30 percent of the contract, 
was probably designed to meet some urgent need and to give the banker time to organize the 
fundraising for the other disbursements. In April 1591, TF is expected to pay 69,700 ducats 
and the Crown is expected to pay 75,000 ducats. Recall that TF disburses escudos but they are 
converted into ducats for the accountants.  
 
that Fiesco paid the promised amount to Ambrosio Spínola. These notes could not have been 





TF’s main tasks began after the transfers, in June 1591. They concern eight mesadas of 
equal amounts to be disbursed until to January 1592, for a total of about 240,000 ducats. The 
Crown’s liabilities will last until November 1592. All the payments, both from the banker and 
from the King are recorded in the contract in units of a mesada of 30,033 ducats (examples 
below). This method made it easier for the royal accountants to keep track of the 
implementation of the contract. It also facilitates the summary presentation of Table 1. 
The disbursements by TF are recorded in Column 2, and payments by the Crown in Column 3, 
both in units of mesadas (30,033 ducats). While the dates of the disbursements are fixed, most 
payments by Crown have only a deadline. For example, the mesada of June 1591 must be 
repaid by the end of the year 1591. The archives contain a complete documentation on the 
monitoring of this repayment, most of which was made before the deadline (Section 2.2). 
Column 4 shows the balance due (always in units of mesada) assuming repayment at the 
contractual deadline. Column 5 provides a brief summary of the sources of revenue that could 
be tapped for the repayment. These descriptions will be central in this article. The three months 
between February and April 1592 are grouped together in a single line because no payment is 
expected during this period. The same applies to the four months between June and September 
1592. 
For the disbursements and payments in the last three months of 1591, the cells are divided in 
two. The right–hand side of the cell (dark grey) shows an option that could be exercised by the 
Crown (Section 4.1). This option turned out to be irrelevant. The fleet did not arrive.  The 
interest is paid in a lump-sum payment, in the last row (Section 3). 
The penultimate column refers to the page numbers of the contract, which is available on line 
(original, transcription and translation) at “chamley.net”. The letters refer to marks that have 
been added to the posted text of the contract. The last column refers to the section of this 







Table 1: Disbursements by TF and payments by the Crown in units of mesada 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 













2.5   
(75,000) 
0 Cash transfer. 3 (a)  
2.1 




0 Millones of choice; if not, alcabalas or any farmed income of 
choice, assistance from judges (550 mrs per diem), seniority 
claims, nor later than 5/91. 
3-4 (b) 
3 6/91   1     1    
4 7/91   1     2    
5 8/91   1     3   
6 9/91   1     4   
7 10/91   1  (0)  4   
8 11/91   1  (0) 3   
- If fleet arrives,  
Crown either pays 3 units within 30 days. 6 (d)  
4.1 
9 or no payment/disbursement of the 3 units. 7 
 
10 
- If the fleet does not arrive, the Crown pays from other sources 
(millones, alcabalas, etc…) with monthly interest rate of 1%. 
Repayments stated—verbatim-- as on page 4 (b). 
 
11 1 4 Millones. 10  
12 12/91   1  (0)    1 3 Sales of lands, offices, jurisdictions (local judicial power) 4 (c) 2.2 
13 1/92   1     3    
14 2-4/92   9 Total balance for 3 months, each with 3 units.   
 
15 
5/92  1 3 Millones; if not, alcabalas /alcabalas or other revenues. 
Verbatim as for the 5/91 payment (page 4 (b)). 
11  
16 6-9/92   8 4 Months with balance of 2 units.   
 
17 
10/92  1 2 Crusade, Subsidio and Escusado. Payment orders could be sold 
by TF. 
11  
18 11/92  1 1 Same as previous. 11  
19 
 
Total  8 
(240,264) 
47    
20 Interest  11,936  Same as for the 12/91 payment (Section 2.2); grouped with that 








2. The collection of dispersed revenues 
A central argument in this article is that large asientos provided the contractual means to merge 
many sources of revenues in Castile, some of them very small and all of them in the local 
currency, into steady streams of disbursements outside Castile in a foreign currency. The next 
two subsections examine this process for the first two payments by the Crown, in May and 
December 1591, respectively. 
2.1 The final payment on the transfer (May 1591) 
We saw that the Crown had to pay 24,733 ducats by the end of May 91 for the second tranche 
of the transfer (line 2 in Table 1). Since this transaction did not involve credit or interest, it had 
to meet the deadline. On page 3 of the contract : 
“24,733 ducats from the service of the 8 millones conceded to me by my kingdoms in the 
payment at the end of May of the current year in the parties that he wants to request, and 
if he does not receive it from this service, he shall be paid in alcabalas or any farmed 
income administrated in my kingdoms and without lien, for the said day at the end of 
May, from the parties that he may request.” 
The millones had been voted by the Cortes in 1590 after the disaster of the Great Armada, as 
an extraordinary tax for 6 years with a total of 8 million ducats. In the previous clause, the 
Crown acknowledges that it is not sure that payments can be made from this source of revenue. 
It therefore provides for access to other sources. It is also unclear which of these other sources 
can be tapped, free from any liens or other encumbrances. The alcabalas were the most stable 
source. The administration and collection of these sale taxes was devolved to the cities that 
were obliged by an agreement in the Cortes to deliver a fixed amount per year, the 
encabezamiento. The encabezamiento of a particular city was subjected as a first claim to the 
service of juros. These were long-term annuities that were specifically written on that city. 
(The same office often collected the alcabalas and paid the coupons of the juros.) Since tax 




of the alcalabas, and juros were the safest government bonds.18 However, because of 
the decentralization of the system, some alcabalas could be fully committed to the juros, while 
others still had some surplus after the obligation of service.  The accounting office would 
eventually have information on the surpluses available in the different cities. The text of the 
contract makes it very clear that the available alcabalas were not known at the time of the 
contract was signed and that multiple guarantees had to be given to the banker.  
And if sufficient funds could not be found in the alcabalas? In that case, the banker could turn 
to “any farmed income administered in my kingdoms and without a lien for the said day at the 
end of May from the parties that he [TF] may request.” Here we should again emphasize the 
decentralization of the tax system. Tómas Fiesco had a long-standing relation with the Crown 
and had accumulated considerable knowledge of the Castilian fiscal system. Without this 
knowledge, he would not have signed a contract allowing him to claim income “from the 
parties that he would demand.”  
For Tómas Fiesco, identifying sources of income was not enough. He needed also legal 
guarantees. This legal assistance is provided for in the following paragraph of the contract: 
“… he [TF] will have judges if he requires assistance, at the rate of 500 maravedis of 
wages for travel expenses to his satisfaction.” 
And this may still not be enough yet! The following paragraph opens another direction for the 
reimbursements: 
“and if the said payment orders [libranzas] do not suffice from the parties to whom they 
are issued and if they remain uncertain or cannot be collected for whatever reason, then 
the shortfall and the part that remains uncertain must be assigned [librar] to the said 
service or to any of the other farmed revenues which there may be for the said period or 
 





as soon as possible thereafter from any party that he may request. He must be 
given the necessary libranzas (payment orders) and recaudos.”19   
In the search for free sources of revenues, once such a source has been found it should be 
protected from other creditors, as in the next paragraph: 
“These claims must have priority over other claims issued or subsequently modified and 
the payments must be denominated in gold or silver without any other form of customary 
monetary or tax anticipation, without any delay.” 
2.2 Repayment of the first mesada and interest (no later than 12/1591): sale of offices 
The previous payment had a tight deadline at the end of May 1591 because it was part of an 
interest-free transfer agreement. Other Crown payments were due much later. For the first of 
these, the contract did not fix a specific date but it set the deadline at the end of the year 1591. 
In Table 1, this payment of 30,033 ducats is therefore included on line 12, for 12/91, column 5. 
In the same month of December 1591, another payment of 11,936 ducats is due for the interest 
paid to TF (line 20). This payment is specified later in the contract but its clauses repeat, word 
for word, those of the first repayment. In the attachment to the contract, the accountants have 
combined the two payments as a single debt of 41,967 ducats. Let’s look at the contract first, 
and then at its implementation. 
The contract 
On page 4 (item (c)), 
“30,033 ducats from what is due to me without lien for the whole of this year of 1591 
from the first day of this month of April until the end of the said year in sales of free 
(uncultivated) lands and offices, jurisdictions, knight taxes, tax exemptions for villages 
and small towns, posts in military orders and any other items of extraordinary income 
 
19  A libranza is a payment order that the royal officials produce to pay an amount of money 
owed by the Crown to the claimant. The claimant must present the libranza to the fiscal 
office to be paid. A recaudo orders the tax office payer to make the payment. This is a proof 




which in any way may be due to me now or in the future. These items must be 
selected by TF or his agent for liquidation.”  
As with regard to the May payment, legal protection is provided in the following paragraph 
(page 5):  
“And for the collection, TF will be provided without further ado the required cedulas and 
instruments for collection at his convenience, so that he or his agent may collect what is 
due in the manner that I [the King] may do so on the dates required the terms of these 
debts. […] For collection, TF will have executors who will have full jurisdiction (vara 
alta de justicia), days and wages necessary to pay the costs of collection of any payments 
from the payers.” 
 “In the manner that I may do so”: the King explicitly uses the banker as an agent for the 
collection of royal revenues. Despite the assistance of executors, TF may not get the payments 
and more guarantees are included in the following paragraph. 
“It is stated that if any of the said obligations were uncertain and TF could not recover 
them, others will be given to him, but he must return the uncertain obligations that he 
could not recover to the Royal Finance. He will receive payment orders for other 
revenues, free of lien, that he requests and chooses, for a full collection in this said year, 
as mentionned, or as soon as possible. If some of the people and municipalities that owed 
money went to court and TF or his agent, in order to be paid, had to post a bail 
[collateral] according to the law of Toledo,20 it is my will that no one will ask him for it, 
he will have no obligation to give it and there is not recourse to any one, except to my 
Council of Finance.” 
These clauses provide a template and are repeated verbatim for other Crown payments. All of 
these clauses confirm the uncertainty about the availability of particular revenues for the 
Crown when the contract was written. It was signed without the knowledge of all the 
 
20 Some debtors to the Crown may have resisted payment and allowed themselves be "executed", 
that is, they let justice intervene to force them to do so. Once a judge opened proceedings to seize 
property, according to the Toledo law, creditors could collect from their assets, but had to post a 




repayments’ details. These clauses could not have been written without the 
professional experience of the banker in a long standing position as a fiscal agent for the 
Crown. Legal assistance and a license for further searches is provided by the contract if an 
initial attempt proves unsuccessful, as well as seniority rights once he has found “a good shell.” 
The banker’s guarantees for the first repayment (May 1591) and the second (by December 
1591 at the latest) are very similar but the ranges of revenues are different. The first is made 
from millones or alcabalas. The second is made from the sale of offices.   
The implementation: the sale of offices 
The complete accounts of the collection of revenues for this repayment have been attached to 
the contract in the Simancas archives. All the funds came from the sales of offices or vacant 
lands21. The total of 41,970 ducats is made up of 87 individual payments, most of them small 
or very small. The attachment shows, for each individual payment, the month, the amount, the 
object of the purchase, the name of the buyer and the location. The complete list is provided in 
Appendix D (online). We summarize these payments according to three-dimensional 
distribution by size, location and time. 
In Figure 1, the amounts are expressed in ducats on the horizontal axis. For each bracket of 50 
ducats, the number of payments is shown on the vertical axis. The distribution of amounts is 
heavily skewed towards small values. The average of the payments is equal to 482 ducats, and 
the median is 150 ducats. There are 53 payments of only 50 ducats, the annual income of an 
unskilled worker, each for an installment towards the purchase of a notary’s office. In Figure 2, 




21 The small amounts collected by TF were not taxes but payments due by different buyers of royal 
lands and offices. Payments were often made in installments and could be stopped by death or 















Recall that the banker could collect “from the first day of this month of April until the end of 
the said year.” Tómas Fiesco had an incentive to collect as quickly as possible and he 
immediately started to sell offices. Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution of the payments 
according to their date as a fraction of the total amount due. By the end of August, half of the 
total had already been collected. Given the distribution over time, the actual duration of the 
credit was only between 3.5 and 4 months, much less than the six-month contract period 
between June and December 1591. 
 
 
Figure 3: Time profile of payments for the first tranche  
For that first tranche of December 1591, 11 payments that had been initially tapped had to be 
transferred to 9 other sources. They are presented in Table 4 (Appendix B). One of the initial 
payments was for a single ducat and another for 5 ducats! Nevertheless, the total of 11 
payments that had to be replaced by other sources, 2,753 ducats, was small with respect to the 
whole tranche of 41,969 ducats. Everything was eventually paid, 98.5 percent of which was 




3. The rate of interest of the credit 
The Crown explicitly recognized, as in many contracts, that the banker did not lend his own 
funds and that he provided financial intermediation in the credit market.22 
“And because the said TF in order to make the payments that he must make of the said 
300,000 escudos in accordance with this asiento for which he receives consignations 
with such a long term and must make many arrangements and obtain credit for a long 
time and a large quantity of maravedis, I hold it for good that he receives as reward 
and gratification for the many interests that he must bear and undergo, for this reason 
and for the cost of recovering the said consignations, 11,936 ducats” (p. 12). 
We have seen in Section 2.2 how the lump-sum payment of 11,936 ducats23 was made before 
the end of 1591, although the final debt was not repaid until November 1592 (Table 1).24 Let 
us evaluate the implicit monthly interest rate on the credit to the Crown. The implicit monthly 
rate can therefore be computed by tracking the credit balance. Accounting is greatly facilitated 
by the use of the mesada of 30,033 ducats as a unit of transfer both for the banker and the 
Crown, as shown in Table 1. Following the usual practice in asientos at the time, interest is not 
compounded. It is therefore sufficient to add the “units of months” of the balances, in Column 
 
22  Most of the time, bankers do not lend their own money, as acknowledged by many publications 
on asientos. However, what has not been acknowledged is that this intermediation is a critical 
element for the understanding of the crisis of 1575-77. By suspending the payments to the bankers, 
the Crown in effect suspended payments on its own subjects and thus pressured the Cortes to accept 
a doubling of taxation (Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley 2014). 
23 We do not know why the amount was of 11,936 ducats, instead of a round number such as 
12,000 ducats. (Accountants did not use ducats but maravedis as units of account. 11,936 ducats are 
valued at 4,475,000 mrs, but 12,000 ducats are equal to 4,500,000 mrs.) Perhaps some other 
transfers were made informally. 





4 of Table 1.25 We make the convention that the balance at the beginning of the month 
includes the disbursement that is due by the end of the month, as in the Maluenda contract 
(Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley 2018). The method generates an upper limit on the ex ante debt 
balance. 
We can set aside the transfers in April and May 1591 and also the three mesadas for the last 
quarter of 1591 (lines 8-10) because they are treated separately in the contract, as we will see 
later. The balance is therefore the same in October and November as in September (4 units) 
and is reduced by one unit in December because of the November payment. The calculation 
yields a total of  47 units of months. If disbursements and Crown payments are credited at the 
same time, this number is reduced to 42. 
With a total balance of 47 units, the monthly rate of return is equal to 11,936/(47 x 
30,033)=0.85%. If we take a balance of 42 units, the rate is 0.95%. In addition, if we take into 
account the early payments on the first tranche, which were specifically authorized in the 
contract (Section 2.2), and were therefore anticipated, the rate of the contract is about one 
percent per month. Finally, as we shall see below, the banker could reduce the maturity of the 
term of the contract by being reimbursed through the sale of juros, up to the maximum amount 
of 100,000 ducats, which represents approximately three mesadas. 
This calculation does not take into account the mesadas for the last three months of 1591. 
Either they were to paid no later than 30 days after the arrival of the fleet, which is expected to 
be in October, ahead of the disbursments, or an interest rate of one percent per month is 
applied to the credit for these disbursements (see next section). From these figures it can be 
safely concluded that the rate provided for in the contract is the usual rate at the time, which is 
approximately one percent per month on the balance due, the same as in the Maluenda 
contract. 
4. Other services 
4.1 An option for the Crown to reduce the size of the contract 
 





The mesadas for the last three months of 1592 are part of an option for the Crown 
which is described in pages 7-9 (lines 7-12 of Table 1). The choices are as follows: 
(i).  If the fleet carrying the silver from the Americas arrives before the end of October, then 
(a) either the Crown pays the three mesadas (90,100 ducats) within 30 days of the arrival 
of the ships (and payments by the Crown are made out of fleet monies), 
“90,100 ducats with first claim on the first gold, silver or reales that will arrive 
for me from any part of the Indies or their islands to any part or port from my 
kingdoms and Portugal in the current year of 91. These have to be paid soon 
[luego] after the arrival of the ships. A cedula will be given on my behalf so that 
the president of the official judges of the Casa de la Contratación in Seville or 
any other responsible person will pay to the satisfaction of TF from the money 
that will come to me,” 
(b) or, continuing without interruption,  
“on the express condition that if 30 days after the arrival what is expected from 
the Indies of this current year is not collected by TF, because one has decided not 
to pay him, he is not obliged to make the last payments from the end of October 
to the rest of this current year of 591.” 
(ii) Finally, immediately following the previous sentence, 
“If at the end of October of the current year, TF, because the fleet has not 
arrived, wants the 90,100 ducats to be paid on the Crusade, the Subsidio and the 
Excusado or on the ordinary and extraordinary service of my kingdoms that are 
paid to me, or on any debts owed to me, he may request that the 90,100 ducats 
be paid of all these revenues, the payment orders must be remitted to him with, 
in addition, interest of one percent per month, counted from the said day at the 
end of October of the current year until the days on which the payment orders 
are made.” 
How should this option be interpreted? Compared to the other parts of the contract, the first 




banker may not have a direct claim on the Crown and would want to be paid 
immediately with the threat of not paying the mesadas. But this is not a penalty. The banker 
may not pay, but the Crown doesn’t pay for these mesadas either. There is no mention of a 
payments of the 90,100 ducats in a contract that carefully details the repayments of the 
banker’s other disbursements. If the Crown does not pay, there is just a pari passu reduction in 
the payments from the Crown and the banker. The practical outcome in the contract is that if 
the fleet arrives, the Crown has the choice of either paying 90,100 ducats and receiving the 
three mesadas with the same total, or    all this and effectively reducing the size of the contract. 
What the Crown cannot do is to keep the silver from the fleet and pay for the three mesadas by 
other means, as if the fleet had not arrived, which is the case (ii) in the contract. 
There should be no doubt as to the operational meaning of clause (i). One need only read the 
contract. But the motivation for the clause is not known. We doubt that the motivation could be 
the uncertainty about fleet’s payment: in the clause (ii) when the fleet does not arrive, the 
contract states explicitly that a special account must be opened to keep track of the balance due 
on these three mesadas and that interest of one percent per month must be charged on the 
current balance; in addition, the contract provides the same guarantees as before if the banker 
has to transfer the repayments between sources of revenues. There is no penalty in this 
clause.26 
Four years later, a clause identical to (ii) was included in Maluenda contract for a large 
payment from the fleet, without an option. On the basis of the archival documents of the ex 
post monitoring of the contract, we showed that the payments were spread over a few weeks. 
 
26  Drelichman and Voth (2014) give a very different account of the Fiesco contract, and in 
particular of this option. Our Table 1 follows the text of the contract, paragraph by paragraph, as the 
reader can verify by comparing with the transcription and the translation of the contract that are 
posted on line. Their table on Crown and banker payments should correspond to our Table 1 but 
there is no relation between the two (except, surprisingly, for two payments of 30,100 ducats). A 
central argument in their analysis of the contract is the “contingent debt and excusable default”. The 
Fiesco asiento, which is the only verifiable evidence they present for such a clause, does not have a 
default clause. The so-called “King’s discretion”, with an exhorbitant interest rate, does not exist in 
the contract. Interested researchers can check all our evidence, which we make available, as it is 




The documentation shows the flawless work of the accountants who calculated 
interest on the balance due, at the same rate of one percent per month, prorated to the exact 
days of the payments by the Crown (Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley 2018). 
In fact, we know the turn of events: the fleet of 1591 did not arrive on time and only a fraction 
of money arrived in other ships, months later, in Seville.27 In the summer of 1591, it had been 
learned that Drake was waiting in the Azores. As a precaution, the silver was stored in La 
Havana and returned to Spain by four galleons in January 1592. 
4.2 Foreign exchange transactions 
On page 2 of the contract, the total of the disbursements, 300,000 escudos, is converted into 
maravedis, at the fixed rate of 425 mrs per escudo, for a total of 127,500,000 mrs, which is 
equivalent to 340,000 ducats as 375 mrs are always equal one ducat in Castile. Italian escudos 
paid in Flanders were real/specie money, but Castilian maravedis and ducats (the currency of 
the asiento) were units of accounts. The first had variable values, the seconds had always the 
same value with the specie money circulating in Castile: the real. Gruesos were the unit of 
account of the escudo in Flanders. The exchange rate between the ducat and the escudo 
fluctuated in the market, not because of currency manipulations—there were none since both 
currencies were based on precious metals—but because of variations in liquidity requirements 
in different places and at different times. 
A list of exchange rate between Medina del Campo and Antwerp that is provided by Lapeyre 
(1955) allows us to compare the fixed rate between maravedís/ducats and escudos that is stated 
in the contract to the market rate. The Medina del Campo fairs were the only market in Castile 
in which exchanges with foreign markets were authorized. Any merchant or banker making a 
transfer in or out Castile had to make the transaction in Medina del Campo, or at the exchange 
rates that were established in the fairs (Espejo and Paz 1908; Ruiz Martín 1987). 
 
27 The fleet had already lost 16 ships on the outbound due to bad weather at the entrance of 
Veracruz. On the return, another storm--it was hurricane season—knocked out half of its 78 ships. 
The commander of the fleet, Antonio Navarro de Prado, was investigated and denounced by the 




Contractual payments in Flanders were in escudos of 57 patards, equivalent to 114 
gruesos.28 Table 2 shows data from Lapeyre (1955) on the exchange rate between the half-
yearly fairs in Medina del Campo and Antwerp, which is one of the places of disbursement 
specified in the contract,29 and also the rates that were relevant for two other contracts (which 
will be briefly discussed in the next section). In the Spring of 1591, for example, one Castilian 
ducat (375 mrs) is worth 105 gruesos. The escudo (114 gruesos) is therefore worth 
(114/105).375=407 mrs. The contract that puts the escudo, the currency of the disbursements, 
at 425 mrs charges a commission of 4.4 percent, less than what some banks would charge 
today. 
The rate did fluctuate above and below its value at the signature of the contract. For example, 
in October 1592 when the Crown made one of its last payments, the ducat had appreciated by 
4.5 percent compared to a year before and the banker made a nice profit on that repayment. An 
exact measurement of the profit on the exchange is not the subject of this article, however. 
What matters here is the rate ex ante at the signature of the contract. The measurement of the 
rate ex post would require information on all the exchange transactions of the banker. In fact, 
many bankers did not repatriate funds from Castile using bills of exchange issued in Medina 
del Campo. They often exported coins and bars of silver to be sold in Italy and transfer their 
value to Flanders in order to pay their debts there. Moreover, any transaction should not be 
separated from the entire portfolio of the banker’s contracts between fairs since any contract 
could be used as part of the portfolio’s hedging strategy. 
The negotiation of exchange rates in the contract was another potential source of profit for the 
banker, but that profit was not guaranteed as we can see from the Agustín Spínola’s asiento in 
1589 (table 2). The king had reasons for fixed exchange rate in the contract. Dealing with 
fluctuating exchange rates, bills of exchange and negotiations with merchants in the Medina 
del Campo fairs could create serious problems when the army was waiting for its pay. A fixed 
rate also enabled the Crown to know in advance the final cost of the transfers and to better 
evaluate the financing needs ahead of time. 
 
28 One patard=2 gruesos. (Lonchay 1907, p. 1012). 
29 At the time, many financial contracts were contingent on the dates of commercial fairs, which 




















Feb-89 102 102 419.12 408     
Jun-89  104    - 105 104.5 409.09 408     
Oct-89  105    - 106 105.5 405.21 408     
Feb-90  102.6  - 103 102.8 415.86 408 430   
Jun-90  102  - 102.5 102.25 418.09 408 430   
Oct-90  102.5  - 103 102.75 416.06   430   
Feb-91  104.5 - 106 105 407   430 425 
Jun-91  105 – 105.5 105.25 407   430 425 
Oct-91 105 - 105.5 105 407     425 
Feb-92  100    - 101 100 427     425 
Jun-92  109.5 - 115 115 372     425 
Oct-92   110    - 111 110 389     425 
Source: Lapeyre (1955, Tables XV and XVI, p. 499-500), and AGS, CCGG, 90. 
 
 
30 The Medina-Antwerp rate could be higher than the Antwerp-Medina rate, depending on 
the need for liquidity. 
31 The contract rate is below the market rate, except in October 89, which implies a loss on 
exchange. We have checked that there is no error. We have seen that some asientos (e.g. with 
Bernabé Centurión), fix an exchange rate very close to the market rate, with possible losses, 
but bring other valuable advantages to the banker. It was also a method of offering other 
compensations when the Crown was short of cash. Also, some asientos have an interest rate 




4.3 An option for the banker to refinance into funded long-term debt 
The credit component of asientos filled the short-term gaps between government spending and 
revenue, but since their interest rate was about double that of the long-term juros, any 
accumulation of debt by asientos was refinanced by juros. The dominant part of the public debt 
(more than 90%) was in these long-term annuities (perpetuals or life-annuities) that were 
redeemable and tradable. The best experts to sell juros were of course the bankers. They had 
been active in the juros market since the 1560s (like the Pope’s bankers with indulgences and 
annuities). Prior to 1575, bankers held juros as collateral, juros de resguardo (Ruiz Martín, 
1965, p. xxxi; Braudel, 1983, p. 523) that they could sell instead of being repaid in cash. 
However, if the Crown paid cash, the banker had to return the juros or other juros of the same 
type. The banker had the option to get cash by selling the juros and the Crown had the option 
to buy back the option. Since juros were rarely identical, there could be a lot of confusion, 
which the bankers of course exploited. These juros de resguardo became an important issue 
during the crisis of 1575-1577, which will be examined elsewhere.  
After 1577, the juros de resguardo were abolished, or rather, they were inserted in the asientos 
within a strict framework: many contracts included an option, up to a certain amount, whereby 
the banker could obtain cash by selling juros, to be chosen from a menu which was fixed in the 
contract, but the Crown could not buy back the option. The asientos were therefore a financial 
vehicule for easily refinancing short-term debt with long-term debt at a lower interest rate. We 
have provided a detailed analysis of this process for an asiento with the Maluenda brothers in 
1595, which very much resembles the Fiesco contract--mesadas for one year with all payments 
in ducats--(Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley 2018). The Maluendas received a put option from 
juros, mainly life annuities on two heads, for 62 percent of the non-transfer part of the contract. 
They began exercising the option immediately after the signing and with such diligence that for 
most of the term of the contract, cumulated sales exceeded cumulated mesadas that were 
disbursed, net of the cash payments by the Crown. In total, they sold 69 annuities at an average 
value of approximatively 2,500 ducats, which is much higher than the price of most offices 
sold by Fiesco in Figure 2. The juros were funded by local revenues such as sales of offices 
and they required a similar expertise. But it was easier for a banker to sell juros than to collect 
installements of 50 ducats for notary’s office in some small village.  For the sale of juros, the 




The Fiesco contract included, on page 14, an option, up to a maximum of 100,000 
ducats (approximatively 40 percent of the contract net of the transfer), for the sales of juros and 
alcabalas.32 The juros were to be single life annuities (for a total not exceeding 50,000 ducats) 
or perpetual annuities. The rates were the same as in the Maluenda contract, 14.25 and 7.14 
percent, respectively. We have dealt extensively with this topic in our previous work and its 
technicalities are not the subject of the present article.  What is important to remember, 
however, is that this option fits well with the banker’s role in collecting small, dispersed 
incomes. 
5. Other asientos 
The main feature of the Fiesco contract is to transform dispersed revenues, which cannot be 
precisely identified at the time of signing, into regular flows of mesadas for the military. These 
characteristics are typical of the asientos of last decade of Philip II. We have already mentioned 
the Maluenda contract.  We provide an additional comparison with three asientos that delivered 
very large mesadas for about a year to the army of Flanders. For the first two, the exchange 
rates were already in Table 2. Figure 4 shows their distribution of the types of income that were 
used for repayment. It should be stressed that these figures do not take into account the 
flexibility of the contracts. For example, in the asiento of Ambrosio Spínola, if the payment 
from the fleet is not made 20 days after its arrival, a special account is opened with a one 
percent monthly interest  (as in the Maluenda and the Fiesco contract). In the contract with 
Augustín Spinola, a payment of 100,000 ducats from the fleet can be replaced by income from 
the Crusade, Subsidio or Escusado if the fleet is delayed. Another clause provides an option for 
selling juros at the rate of 6 or 7 percent, up to 45,333 ducats, instead of waiting for the arrival 
of the fleet. 
 
32 The purchase of an alcabala—there were many of them—gave the perpetual right to collect 
that particular tax. (It was like buying a juro funded on the total amount of that alcabala). 
With a price of 30,000 per thousand, the implicit rate of return was only 3.3 percent but this 
right meant much more that a monetary income: nouveaux riches could acquire these rights, 






                    Agustín Spínola                                                        Ambrosio Spínola 
              13 mesadas (4/89-4/90)                                                13 mesadas (3/90-3/91) 
 
 
    Agustín Spínola and Nicolao de Negro                                        Tomás Fiesco  
              14 mesadas (9/95-10/96)                                            10 mesadas (4/91-1/92) 
 
                                                     Figure 4 
                       Sources of revenues for the repayments of asientos 
 
In the third asiento, Augustín Spinola and Nicolao de Negro (July 26, 1595), ASNN, undertake 
to deliver to “don Jeronimo Balter Zapata, paymaster of the army in the provinces of Flanders 
or to a person designated by the Carinal Archiduque Alberto” one million escudos in 12 































































September 96. As in the Fiesco asiento, the contract first calculates the total debt of the 
Crown in ducats at the exchange rate of 408 mrs per escudo. The repayment installments are 
summarized in Table 3. 




Any consignacion that is not mortgaged (desembargadas) in 1595, or in the 
millones, servicios ordinarios and extraordinarios, alcabalas, tercias and any farmed 
revenue, sales of vacant lands and offices, or any other ordinary or extrordinary 
debt owed to the Crown, at the choice of ASNN. 
75,000   Debt of Sevile, arbitrios, and if not available, non mortgaged revenues from the 
three graces, or any ordinary or extraordinary consignaciones, etc..  
75,000   Debt of the cardinal of Toledo, if unpaid at the end of 95, then a menu of sources 
similar to the ones before 
466,667  Not later than 20 days after the arrival of the fleet. If not, same as above. 
263,000  
75,000 
In 1596, three graces, farmed revenues and other payment orders on ordinary 
and extraordinary revenues.  
6. Conclusion 
Our method of investigation is the opposite of a current trend of interpreting historical data 
through “codes.” What does this careful reading of the text of the Fiesco contract (and the 
comparisons with other large contracts) bring us? Tómas Fiesco’s role is not for a foreign 
banker to make a sovereign loan in the usual sense of the word. Rather, he is responsible for 
conducting fiscal and financial transactions on behalf of the King “in the manner that I may do 
so.”  This role is natural in the context of pre-modern times, when states had not developed an 
administration capable of managing the fragmented territories and local customs inherited from 




modern sovereign loan.33 In Ancien Régime France, tax farmers advanced funds to the 
Crown. The loan component of the asiento appears here as an advance of funds in the process 
of the transformation of scattered sources of income into regular streams of disbursements. 
Credit is a relatively modest part of the Fiesco asiento. In the event of the arrival of the fleet, 
this credit component corresponds to an average duration of about three months for the entire 
amount of the contract (12,000 interest for a three months loan of 340,000 at 1 percent per 
month), or equivalent to one sixth of the total amount for the entire 18 months of the contract.  
The rate of return is in fact a poor indicator of the profitability of a contract. The text 
acknowledges that the banker raises funds on the private market, which earn interest. In 
addition, currency conversions are profit opportunities. The text of the contract is very clear on 
the conversion procedure and we believe that this procedure could easily be understood by 
negotiators to get a sense of the profit that the banker could gain from the exchange, and to 
draft a fair contract. A deeper evaluation would require the inspection of the bankers’ books, 
which is another project.  
The text shows, paragraph after paragraph, the difficulties the banker may encounter in 
collecting what is due, either because previous obligations to the Crown have been mortgaged 
by other debts in the decentralized system, or because he may encounter some local resistance. 
This function of merchant-bankers and asientos has two implications. First, the uncertainty 
about sources of revenues, which is a dominant feature of the text, implies that often no firm 
date can be established by the contracts for the payments to the banker, and the contract 
addresses this issue with an explicit provision (which is found in other contracts): accountants, 
who are responsible for monitoring all contracts, calculate an exact balance, day by day, of 
what is owed to the banker and apply a fixed interest rate, around one per cent per month. 
Second, the integration of asentistas into the Castilian public finance system shows that Philip 
II’s suspensions of payments could not be compared to modern sovereign debt failures. As we 
have already shown (Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley2016), during the suspension between 1575 
and 1577, Philip II was careful to protect the Genoese bankers who were so important in his 
system of public finance.    
 
33 Farming contracts were not limited to the collection of revenues. The Pope’s bankers were in 
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Asientos in Madrid for 1591 
 
First disb. Signature Merchant banker ducats escudos Place of disb Disb. 
number 
Fiscal resources 
1 01/02/1591 21/05/1591 Marco Antonio Obada         30.000  
 
Antwerp & Cologne  Ordinary taxes 
2 01/02/1591 21/05/1591 Octavio de Marín       211.000  
 
Antwerp & Cologne  Ordinary taxes and Extraordinary Income 
3 01/02/1591 21/05/1591 Simon Ruiz         54.000  
 
Antwerp & Cologne  Ordinary taxes 
4 01/02/1591 21/05/1591 Simon Ruiz         50.000  
 
Antwerp & Cologne  Ordinary taxes 
5 01/02/1591 21/05/1591 Juan Luis Vitoria         60.000  
 
Antwerp & Cologne  Ordinary taxes 
6 01/02/1591 21/05/1591 Francisco y Pedro de Maluenda       211.000  
 
Antwerp & Cologne  Millones 
7 01/02/1591 21/05/1591 Bautista de Franquis         84.000  
 
Antwerp & Cologne  Ordinary taxes and Extraordinary Income 
8 
 
13/02/1591 Pedro de Baeza vecino de Lisboa 
  




01/03/1591 Pedro de Baeza vecino de Lisboa 
  




10 15/03/1591 21/05/1591 Antonio Suarez de Vitoria y Juan Luis 
Vitoria 
      100.000  
 
Antwerp & Cologne  Extraordinary Income 
11 
 







03/04/1591 Tomas Fiesco 
 
   300.000    Antwerp 10 x 30k Ordinary taxes and Extraordinary Income 
13 
 
05/04/1591 Diego de Alburquerque y herederos, 
Gonzalo de Salazar y Joan de 
Carmona 
      200.000  
 
Madrid  Ordinary taxes 
14 
 
23/04/1591 Francisco y Pedro de Maluenda 
 
   300.000    Antwerp & Besançon 10 x 30k Ordinary taxes and Extraordinary Income 
15 
 
12/05/1591 Ambrosio Spínola 
 
1.600.000    Flanders, Burgundy & 
Savoy 
8 x 200k Sevilla, fleets, Cruzada, Ordinary taxes 
and Extraordinary Income 
16 
 
12/05/1591 Ambrosio Spínola 
 




18/06/1591 Ambrosio Spínola 
 
   100.000    Besançon & Chambery 2 x 50k Sevilla & Millones 
18 30/09/1591 02/03/1592 Octavio de Marín         51.311  
 
Antwerp & Cologne  Ordinary taxes and Extraordinary Income 
19 30/09/1591 02/03/1592 Francisco y Pedro de Maluenda       136.499  
 
Antwerp  Juros and Ordinary taxes 
20 30/09/1591 02/03/1592 Juan Luis Vitoria         96.744  
 




21 30/09/1591 02/03/1592 Julio Gentil hijjo de Agustín         73.828  
 
Antwerp  Cruzada & Subsidio 
22 30/09/1591 02/03/1592 Pedro de Ysunta           9.086  
 
Antwerp  Ordinary taxes 
23 30/09/1591 02/03/1592 Tomas Fiesco       102.423  
 
Antwerp  Ordinary taxes 
24 30/09/1591 02/03/1592 Simon Ruiz         85.186  
 
Antwerp  Ordinary taxes 
25 22/11/1591 02/03/1592 Ambrosio Spínola         24.988  
 
Antwerp  Cruzada, Subsidio, Escusado 
   




Source: AGS CCGG 90. Some asientos are signed in 1592, with their first disbursement in 1591. An escudo is worth about 10 percent 
more than the ducat (depending on the contract, see Table 2).
APPENDIX B (on line) 
Table 4 
Deficiencies and substitutions in the payments of the first tranche (12/1591 in Table 1) 
Date Object Place Buyer Ducats 
12/1591 Notary Madrid Lázaro Martínez              2.200    
5/1591 Free lands   vecinos de Corpaquilo                171    
8/1591 Free lands Villa Brajima                       1    
12/1591 Notary Atapuerca Juan de Vergara                  50    
12/1591 Notary Santo Domingo Antonio Díaz Laynez and his wife                   50    
06/24/1591 Free lands   Antonio del Visso y Miguel Romero                   19    
7/1591 Notary 
San Miguel de 
Alperones 
Antonio de Céspedes and Miguel de 
Ayllón                  50    
  Notary Fuentesclaras Luis Alonso de Nora                   50    
11/1591   Atienza                     57    
8/1591 Free lands La Garrovilla Constanza Benítez                     5    
12/1591 Notary Valdeón Juan Díaz de Valdeón                100    
      TOTAL              2.753    
 
Replacements 
01/7/1591   Alcuesca  Councillor              2.136    
12/19/1591 
City 
councillor Coyn Rodrigo Marquez                175    
01/01/1592 Notary Borona Juan Díaz de Segovia                   50    
01/05/1592 Notary Erguisuelas Pedro Gutierrez de Tras                  50    
08/12/1592 Notary Fuentesclaras Luis Alonso de Nora                100    
06/07/1592 Notary Borona Juan Díaz de Segovia                   50    
  Notary Morana Pedro de Valbuena                   50    
  Notary Domingoseñor Francisco Ercero                   50    
4/1592 Free lands Pezuela  Residents of Pezuela                   92    





APPENDIX C (on line) 
Sales of offices and lands for the payment due no later than December 1591 
 
Year 1591 Ducats 
 












Notary Juan Ochoa de Lariaga Matilla 
560 
 
Free lands Alcalá de Henares 
516 
 
Free lands Medina Sidonia 
300 
 






City councillor Pedro de Tapia Barajas de Huete 
50 
 
Notary Juan Álvarez de Melgarejo Muñoz y Guareña 
50 
 
City councillor Antón Sánchez Cantimpalos 
175 
 
Notary Martín Muñoz de Sancha Arenzana de Abajo 
175 
 
Notary Juan Urraca de Baños Arenzana de Abajo 
80 
 
Tax collector Juan de Luna Galicia 
50 
 
Notary Juan Ruiz de Ledesma Mesón de Carretas 
70 
 
City councillor Antón Sánchez Parejo Linares 
50 
 
Notary Francisco García Ortiz Masa 
50 
 
Notary Andrés de Montejano Barciales 
50 
 
Notary Andrés Láriz de Durango Quintanilla 
50 
 





depository Juan Ronco de Parga Betanzos 
210 
 
Municipal position Juan de Floresgal Mojacar 
267 
 
Wool councillor Francisco Ruiz Herreros 
267 
 
Wool councillor Juan González Serrano 
684 
 
















Exemption villa de Villanueva de Vogas 
50 
 
Notary Blas Sánchez y otros Santa María 
50 
 
Notary Andrés de la Fuente Orejudos 
50 
 
Notary Diego de Buiza Ajos de Rubios 
325 
 
City councillor licenciado Luis de la Tobilla Ronda 
100 
 
City councillor Juan de Águila Huercal 
160 
 
City councillor García de Salazar Zaratan 
50 
 
Notary Francisco Tomé Anaya 
50 
 
Notary Blas Esteban San Julian 
50 
 






Judicial position villa de Hernán Pérez 
901 
 
Broker villa de Fuente el Sauco 
70 
 
Notary Martín de Quintanilla Cazuar 
50 
 
Notary Juan de Palacio y otro Cascajales 
50 
 
Notary Rodrigo de Balbuena y otros Marana 
50 
 
Notary Juan de la Peña Terrones 
500 
 
Notary Lázaro Martínez y otros Hellín 
115 
 
Notary Pablo González y otro Herradon 
50 
 
Notary Juan Sánchez de Montaful Quercal 
2,300 
 
Notary of crime Pedro de Baeza 




3 city councillors 
Francisco de Peñalosa y 
otros Carbona la mayor 
50 
 
Notary Alonso de la Fuente Alcazarén 
50 
 
Notary Gonzalo de Eslava y otros Sancho Gómez 
50 
 








Notary Juan Pérez Eupino y otros Carrascal 
4,695 
 
Free lands Badajoz y Merida 
395 
 












Free lands Campo de Calatrava 
178 
 
Court agent in 
Audiencia 










Notary Francisco Granjal y otro Mencerreys 
50 
 




city councillors lugar de la Mata 
150 
 
City councillor Pedro Sánchez Vela Arjonilla 
220 
 
City councillor Bartolomé Rest y otros 4 Sar 
50 
 











Notary Juan de Mar Tortola 
100 
 
Notary Antonio Pérez de Lacilla Corral 
210 
 
Municipal position Juan Flores  Mojacar 
400 
 
Jail Mayor Miguel Alonso de Escobar León 
250 
 



































Notary Cristóbal de Ibarra Cilleruelos 
50 
 










Notary Francisco Arcilo de Urueña Larrade 
7,167 
 
Free lands Jerez de la Frontera 
2,550 
 
Free lands Arahal 
531 
 
Free lands Talavera del partido de Mérida 
181 
 
Free lands Jerez de la Frontera 
504 
 
Free lands Medina Sidonia 
326 
 
Free lands Córdoba 
659 
 
Free lands Lerma 
1,565 
 
Free lands Atienza 
January 783 
 
Court agent Rodrigo de Llerena Madrid 
 
Total 18,982 
 
TOTAL 
 
41,969 
 
 
 
